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ABSTRACT
From the early nineteenth century up until the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century,
many leading scholars in the emerging ﬁeld of linguistics were occupied with what
would today be considered a kind of linguistic typology. The various classiﬁcations
of languages they proposed were generally intertwined with speculation about the “ra-
cial” traits or national mentalities that different language types might represent and
their putative value relative to one another. This article investigates these schemes
from the perspective of Otto Jespersen’s (1860–1943) theory of “progress in language.”
It ﬁrst shows how Jespersen, inspired by theoretical developments in linguistics and
neighboring sciences, inverted the traditional rankings and praised the modern “an-
alytic” European languages over their classical “synthetic” ancestors. It then explores
contemporary reactions to Jespersen’s theory and traces the gradual disappearance of
language evaluation and related questions from the discipline. Charles Bally (1865–
1947) receives special attention for his nuanced critique of Jespersen’s position, which
casts unique light on linguistic ideology in the period that saw the birth of structuralism
in its different varieties.
M
odern linguistics is a largely dispassionate science, treating its object of study,
the human language faculty and the languages to which it gives rise, as self-
contained systems to be studied in the abstract. This was, however, not always
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so. The beginnings of modern “scientiﬁc” language research are often identiﬁed with
the development of nineteenth-century historical-comparative grammar, whose focus
lay on the formalistic comparison of sounds and morphological patterns in languages
in order to establish their genetic relations. But many comparativists and their scholarly
allies were also equally concerned with what would today be considered a kind of typo-
logical classiﬁcation, which was intertwined with speculation about the “racial” traits or
national mentalities that different language types might represent and their putative
value relative to one another.1 Only in the twentieth century did such questions become
taboo for mainstream linguistics.2
An interesting ﬁgure in the transition from the nineteenth- to the twentieth-century
orthodoxy is the Danish linguist Otto Jespersen (1860–1943), who was occupied through-
out his career with questions of language evaluation: his doctoral dissertation, published
1894 in English translation as Progress in Language, is dedicated to this problem,3 as is his
ﬁnal publication, the 1941 Efﬁciency in Linguistic Change.4 The topic also features prom-
inently in his 1922 magnum opus, Language.5 Jespersen’s innovation was to invert the
aesthetic judgments of the preceding century. While his forebears generally saw in the
complex “synthetic” morphology of the classical Indo-European languages—Sanskrit,
Greek, and Latin—the height of linguistic development, Jespersen praised the simple “an-
alytic” forms of their present-day descendants as a sign of progress.
This article explores Jespersen’s work on “progress in language” and what it tells us
about linguistic ideology in this period. We begin in Section I with an examination of
Jespersen’s theory and its historical context. Although Jespersen’s proposal answered
to developments in linguistics, it was shaped by inﬂuences well beyond the emerging
discipline, in particular by innovations in contemporary logic and philosophy of math-
ematics. The meeting point of these various ﬁelds was the international language
movement, in which Jespersen actively participated. In Section II, we look at reactions
within linguistics to Jespersen’s theory. We see how nuanced critiques, most notably
1. The best overview of nineteenth-century historical-comparative grammar and language classi-
ﬁcation remains Anna Morpurgo Davies, “Language Classiﬁcation in the Nineteenth Century,” in Cur-
rent Trends in Linguistics, vol. 13, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok (The Hague: Mouton, 1975), 607–716.
2. At the fringes of present-day linguistics, questions of the relative complexity of language types
and their possible place in various evolutionary schemes are once again making their appearance. Such
views have not yet achieved mainstream acceptance. For a good historical overview up to the present
day, see John E. Joseph and Frederick J. Newmeyer, “All Languages Are Equally Complex: The Rise and
Fall of a Consensus,” Historiographia Linguistica 39, nos. 2/3 (2012): 341–68.
3. Otto Jespersen, Progress in Language (London: Sonnenschein, 1894).
4. Otto Jespersen, Efﬁciency in Linguistic Change (1941), reproduced in Selected Writings of Otto
Jespersen (London: Allen & Unwin, 1960), 381–466.
5. Otto Jespersen, Language, Its Nature, Development and Origin (London: Allen & Unwin, 1922).
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that of Charles Bally (1865–1947), teased apart the evaluative schemes of the nine-
teenth century, and yet were ultimately pushed aside as an uncompromising formal-
ism came to dominate the mainstream of linguistics. Section III offers a conclusion.
I . PROGRESS IN LANGUAGE
“THAT LANGUAGE RANKS HIGHEST WHICH GOES FARTHEST IN THE ART OF ACCOMPLISHING MUCH
WITH LITTLE MEANS, OR, IN OTHER WORDS, WHICH IS ABLE TO EXPRESS THE GREATEST AMOUNT OF
MEANING WITH THE SIMPLEST MECHANISM.” This axiom, printed in small capitals, repre-
sents Jespersen’s formula for “measur[ing] linguistic values” and is the guiding prin-
ciple of his thesis of “progress in language.”6 All languages move toward increasing
communicative efﬁciency, believes Jespersen: in every language, there is an appreciable
diachronic tendency toward reducing the effort required on the part of both speaker
and hearer to transmit and receive a message. In his mature work, Jespersen consid-
ered efﬁciency across all key aspects of languages—their sound systems, vocabularies,
and grammars—but his engagement with this topic began with the notion of “analy-
ticity” in grammar, and this always remained his chief concern.7
In the ﬁrst instance, Jespersen’s analyticity is derived from the opposition “analytic”
and “synthetic” in language typology, which originates in the work of August Wilhelm
von Schlegel (1767–1845).8 Drawing on existing morphology-based language classiﬁ-
cations, Schlegel posited a three-way primary division of language types correspond-
ing to the categories isolating, agglutinative, and inﬂecting, which, while no longer em-
ployed in serious typological work, maintain a genericized existence in linguistics up to
the present day. In short, isolating languages, prototypically represented by Classical
Chinese, have no morphology and rely entirely on syntax and auxiliary words to in-
dicate grammatical relationships. Agglutinative languages, typiﬁed by Turkish, have,
in addition to syntax, invariant afﬁxes that attach to roots. Finally, inﬂecting languages,
whose greatest exponents are the classical Indo-European idioms, are distinguished by
the presence of highly irregular inﬂections that are intimately bound to roots. In these
languages, there is no clear separation between root and inﬂection—as there is be-
tween root and afﬁx in the agglutinative languages—and roots must be classiﬁed into
different conjugations and declensions depending on the inﬂections they exhibit. The
obvious loss of the deﬁning property of inﬂection in latter-day Indo-European varie-
6. Ibid., 324. The axiom is repeated from Jespersen, Progress in Language, 13.
7. Compare chaps. 17 and 18 of Jespersen, Language; Jespersen, Efﬁciency; and Jespersen, Progress
in Language.
8. See Anna Morpurgo Davies, History of Linguistics, Volume IV: Nineteenth-Century Linguistics
(London: Longman, 1998), 71–76.
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ties leads Schlegel to divide this group into the older “synthetic languages” (les langues
synthétiques) and their younger descendants, the “analytic languages” (les langues
analytiques).9
While there were certainly many prominent dissenting voices,10 general opinion
among language scholars up to the middle of the nineteenth century saw in the inﬂect-
ing class the height of linguistic development. This judgment would seem to have been
ﬁrst explicitly expressed by Friedrich von Schlegel (1772–1829)—the brother of Au-
gust Wilhelm—who famously admired the “organic” Indo-European languages, in
which the inﬂections grew from the “living germ” (lebendiger Keim) of the root, while
all other languages merely combine roots and afﬁxes “mechanically.”11 Following this
assessment, August Schlegel himself assigned “ﬁrst place” (le premier rang) to the in-
ﬂecting languages.12 Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), although recognizing and
valuing the diversity of grammatical processes exhibited by the world’s languages, sim-
ilarly admired inﬂection, and provided a detailed justiﬁcation for his judgment in terms
of Kantian philosophy. According to Humboldt, language is the locus of the Kantian
“faculty of imagination” (Einbildungskraft), which effects a synthesis of “sensuality”
and “understanding.” A word in language combines a physically perceptible sound with
a concept, and through this combination the two sides, the sound and the concept,
take on deﬁnite form. Only in inﬂected forms is this process of Kantian synthesis prop-
erly achieved. The inﬂected word combines the concept and its relation to the rest of
the proposition—expressed by the root and inﬂection respectively—into a single pack-
age where the concept retains its identity. This is in contrast to isolating and aggluti-
nating structures, where the relation is only in loose association to the concept or not
expressed at all, and to “incorporating” structures—an additional type recognized by
Humboldt, exempliﬁed by the Mexican language Nahuatl—where one concept swal-
lows up another.13
9. August Wilhelm von Schlegel, Observations sur la langue et la littérature provençales (Paris:
Librairie grecque-latine-allemande, 1818), 14–17.
10. Jespersen, Progress in Language, 14–17, and Language, 322–23, summarize a few dissenting
voices from midcentury onward.
11. Friedrich von Schlegel, Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier (Heidelberg: Mohr und Zim-
mer, 1808), 50–52.
12. August Schlegel, Observations, 15.
13. See Jürgen Trabant,Weltansichten: Wilhelm von Humboldts Sprachprojekt (Munich: Beck, 2012),
101–3; James McElvenny, “The Fate of Form in the Humboldtian Tradition: The Formungstrieb of Georg
von der Gabelentz,” Language and Communication 47 (2016): 31–33; Wilhelm von Humboldt, Über
die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einﬂuss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Men-
schengeschlechts (Berlin: Dümmler, 1836), 169.
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In an intellectual environment in which the synthetic inﬂecting languages represent
the height of linguistic development, the loss of inﬂection in their modern analytic de-
scendants could only be a sign of degeneration. This attitude found its most extreme
expression in the work of August Schleicher (1821–68), the leading comparative gram-
marian of midcentury, and Jespersen’s nominated foil in presenting his theory of prog-
ress in language. Discussing the evolution of the older synthetic Germanic languages,
represented by Gothic, into the modern, analytic Germanic languages, Schleicher wrote:
“Our words, as contrasted with Gothic words, are like a statue that has been rolling for
a long time in a bed of a river till its beautiful limbs have been worn off, so that now
scarcely anything remains but a polished stone with faint indications of what it once
was.”14 Just as for Humboldt, Schleicher sees synthetic structures as the grammatical
ideal, because only the inﬂected word properly bundles the concept and its relation into
a single package.15 He sought to force the evolution of language into a scheme of devel-
opment and decline. All languages begin their formation in prehistoric times with iso-
lating structures and strive toward the ideal of ﬂexional synthesis. But only a few lan-
guages reach the height of linguistic development; the rest remain at the beginning or
intermediate stages. In the historical period, this process is reversed and languages de-
volve toward the isolating pole. The degree of degeneracy exhibited by a language is
proportional to the richness and eventfulness of its speakers’ history: for this reason,
among the Germanic languages English has deteriorated much further than Icelandic.16
Jespersen inverted these traditional value judgments. Synthetic forms, he argued,
force the speaker to ﬁt their expression to complex inherited arbitrary structures. The
declensions and conjugations into which inﬂected words must be sorted are invento-
ries of irregularity and superﬂuity. Schleicher’s ideal, asserted Jespersen, is simply the
product of unfounded prejudice, “a grammar-school admiration, a Renaissance love of
the two classical languages [Latin and Ancient Greek] and their literatures.”17 He con-
cluded: “The so-called full and rich forms of the ancient languages are not a beauty but
a deformity.”18 The ideal language would rather “always express the same thing by the
same, and similar things by similar means; any irregularity and ambiguity would be
banished; sound and sense would be in perfect harmony; any number of delicate
14. August Schleicher, Die deutsche Sprache (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1860), 34. The English translation
given here is from Jespersen, Language, 326; see also Jespersen, Progress in Language, 11.
15. Schleicher, Deutsche Sprache, 21.
16. Ibid., 33–35. See also Jespersen, Progress in Language, 4–10, and Language, 76–78, which attrib-
ute Schleicher’s formulation to his “strong preoccupation with Hegelian ideas.”
17. Jespersen, Progress in Language, 9–10.
18. Ibid., 14.
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shades of meaning could be expressed with equal ease”19 Analytic forms are closer to
this ideal: they provide a means for transmitting broken down, analyzed, thoughts
from the speaker to the hearer without excess historical baggage: “In language, analysis
means suppleness, and synthesis means rigidity.”20
Within linguistics, Jespersen’s alternative evaluation rests on a shift that occurred
around the middle of the nineteenth century, in which a new emphasis was placed on
the pragmatic nature of language. This new emphasis arose largely in response to the
materialist excesses of such ﬁgures as Schleicher, who forced his theory into a literalist
biological mold: “Languages are organisms of nature; they have never been directed by
the will of man; they rose, and developed themselves according to deﬁnite laws; they
grew old, and died out. They, too, are subject to that series of phenomena which we
embrace under the name of ‘life.’ The science of language is consequently a natural
science.”21 The reaction—from such linguists as Georg Curtius (1820–85), Johan Ni-
kolai Madvig (1804–86), and William Dwight Whitney (1827–94), all cited by Jesper-
sen in this connection—was to insist on the nature of language as a human institution,
a tool for communication between people, whose historical development is shaped by
forces that manifest themselves in communicative interaction.22 Toward the end of
the century, this position became the received opinion of mainstream linguistics, as
reﬂected in its incorporation into the leading statement of Neogrammarian theory,
Hermann Paul’s Principien der Sprachgeschichte.23 With communication elevated to
the primary purpose of language, communicative effectiveness immediately suggests
itself as a measure of linguistic value.
It is at this point that “efﬁciency” enters the equation. In every act of speech, argues
Jespersen, there are two opposing tendencies at play, “ease” and “distinctness.” “Ease”
is the tendency on the part of speakers to minimize the effort required to articulate
their thoughts, while “distinctness” is the social pressure that demands a minimization
of the effort required on the part of listeners to interpret the linguistic expression.24
19. Ibid., 365. Jespersen reafﬁrmed this view in Language, 441–42, and Otto Jespersen, “Energetik
der Sprache,” in Linguistica: Selected Papers in English, French and German (Copenhagen: Levin &
Munskgaard, 1933), 99.
20. Jespersen, Progress in Language, 25–26.
21. August Schleicher, Darwinism Tested by the Science of Language, trans. Alexander V. W.
Bikkers (London: Camden Hotton, 1869), 20–21. Originally published as Die Darwinsche Theorie
und die Sprachwissenschaft (Weimar: Böhlau, 1863). A summary and assessment of Schleicher’s posi-
tion is offered by Jespersen, Language, 71–76.
22. Jespersen, Language, 86–88. See also Brigitte Nerlich, Change in Language: Whitney, Bréal and
Wegener (London: Routledge, 1990).
23. Hermann Paul, Principien der Sprachgeschichte, 5th ed. (1880; Halle: Niemeyer, 1920).
24. Jespersen, Efﬁciency, 391–92.
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Jespersen sees these two tendencies as driving all kinds of language change, from
sound changes to changes in lexical and grammatical form and meaning.25 These mech-
anisms come directly from the pragmatic conception of language. “Comfort” (Bequem-
lichkeit) was proposed by Curtius as the main driver of sound change: sound changes
come about as speakers seek to reduce the effort required to articulate speech sounds in
their mouths. A brake on sound change, preventing the language from falling into un-
intelligibility, was the opposing need to maintain distinctness between words.26 The
same mode of explanation was employed by Whitney in his “tendency to ease or econ-
omy,” which takes on both a simplifying and regenerative role.27 By abbreviating and
distorting original compound forms, it drives the further development of words toward
the pragmatic ideal of simple signs for communicative exchange: “Thus the tendency to
economy, in the very midst of its destructive action, is at the same time constructive. It
begins with producing those very forms which it is afterward to mutilate and wear out.
Without it, compound words and aggregated phrases would remain ever such. Its
inﬂuence is always cast in favor of subordinating in substance what is subordinate in
meaning, of integrating and unifying what would otherwise be of loose structure—in
short, of disguising the derivation of linguistic signs, making them signs merely, and
signs easy to manage.”28
A more immediate inspiration for Jespersen’s two tendencies comes from the lin-
guist Georg von der Gabelentz (1840–93), whose inﬂuence on his thinking Jespersen
freely acknowledged.29 Jespersen’s orthogonal tendencies to ease and distinctness an-
swer precisely to Gabelentz’s “drive to comfort” and “distinctness” (Bequemlichkeits-
und Deutlichkeitstrieb).30 This connection introduces a complication into Jespersen’s
position, however, since Gabelentz does not restrict himself to purely communicative
considerations. For Gabelentz, “distinctness” goes beyond transmitting a clear phonetic
signal to include the needs of personal aesthetic expression:31 “The reason and purpose
of the need for distinctness is not always related to business: it can also be tempera-
25. Compare Jespersen, Language, 261–64.
26. Curtius’s formulation was widely received by his contemporaries and is signposted by Bertolt
Delbrück (1842–1922) in his introductory history of Indo-European linguistics as one of the waypoints
in the development of this ﬁeld. See Bertolt Delbrück, Einleitung in das Studium der indogermanischen
Sprachen, 6th ed. (1880; Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1919), 172–73. Note that the ﬁrst, second, and
third editions of Delbrück’s book have the title Einleitung in das Sprachstudium.
27. William Dwight Whitney, The Life and Growth of Language (London: King, 1875), 49–74.
28. Ibid., 53.
29. See, e.g., Jespersen, Language, 98.
30. See Georg von der Gabelentz, Die Sprachwissenschaft, ihre Aufgaben, Methoden und bisherigen
Ergebnisse (1891; Berlin: Language Science Press, 2016), 190–94.
31. See McElvenny, “Fate of Form in the Humboldtian Tradition,” 39.
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mental and aesthetic, and in this case we prefer to speak more of expressive, vivid,
striking language than distinct language. But it is still related to essentially the same
distinctness.”32 In his later work, Jespersen allows such factors to play a role in shaping
the character of languages: “Man does not live by bread alone, and language has other
tasks besides being a useful tool for communications. It is used not only for speaking
but also for singing, and talking is often nothing more than a mere playing with sounds
to amuse oneself and one’s hearers.”33 His brief survey of additional tasks of language
includes such linguistic phenomena as poetic devices (meter, rhyme, and alliteration),
taboo and stigmatized languages, in-group slang, and sound symbolism. But despite
making concessions to other uses of language, Jespersen always treats its communica-
tive function as primary.
Although the pragmatic mechanisms of language change to which Jespersen ap-
pealed had become a commonplace in linguistics, his value judgments remained highly
individual. EvenWhitney, a champion of the pragmatic conception, did not deviate far
from Schleicher in his aesthetic views. While he rejected the absolute separation of lin-
guistic classes advocated by many of his contemporaries in favor of a constantly evolv-
ing continuum of linguistic form, Whitney continued to praise Indo-European inﬂec-
tion as the height of linguistic development.34 Gabelentz, by contrast, offers a very
different position. He labels the inﬂection of the Indo-European languages a “defective
system” (Defectivsystem), where the same grammatical function must be expressed
through different arbitrary forms depending on the paradigm to which the root be-
longs. Rather than being a superior representation of concept and relation, as claimed
under the traditional scheme, inﬂection should be seen in the ﬁrst instance as a playful
expression of the mental energy of the Indo-Europeans during the youth of their
“race.”35 Gabelentz’s assessment is not necessarily a deprecation of inﬂection, but rather
a different way of viewing it:36 he is not so much interested in the function it performs
32. “Nicht immer jedoch ist das Deutlichkeitsbedürfniss seinemGrunde und Zwecke nach geschäftlich:
es kann auch gemüthlich und ästhetisch sein, und dann redet man wohl lieber von ausdrucksvoller,
anschaulicher, eindringlicher Sprache, als von deutlicher. Und doch ist es im Grunde immer die
Deutlichkeit, auf die es dabei ankommt” (ibid., 194). All translations aremy own unless otherwise noted.
33. Jespersen, Efﬁciency, 442.
34. See Michael Silverstein, ed., Whitney on Language (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971), xvi–
xviii; cf. McElvenny, “Fate of Form in the Humboldtian Tradition,” 40.
35. Gabelentz, Sprachwissenschaft, 420–23.
36. Interestingly, Jespersen was in fact accused of plagiarizing this aspect of Gabelentz’s work in his
theory of progress in language. The accusations had little credibility and were rebuffed by Gabelentz
himself: they were a move of one of Jespersen’s rivals, Jón Stefánsson, in a no-holds-barred contest for a
professorship in Copenhagen and based on superﬁcial, largely rhetorical, similarities between Gabel-
entz’s and Jespersen’s respective writings. The accusations weremade in Jón Stefánsson,Dr. O. Jespersen
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as in what it reveals about speakers’ temperament. Gabelentz’s approach was funda-
mentally relativistic. Although not averse to passing judgment on languages, he em-
ployed no single measure or scale. Rather, he took the diverse features found across
the world’s languages to reﬂect the individual mental and living conditions of their
speakers. In this alternative assessment of form, Gabelentz was continuing and extend-
ing the strand of Humboldtian thought that values linguistic diversity and seeks to elu-
cidate its causes and implications.37 This approach reemerges in responses to Jespersen’s
theory of progress, discussed below.
But Jespersen’s absolute scale received reinforcement from outside linguistics. “An-
alyticity,” in a related sense, was also a totem of new notational systems in the sciences
that were developed in these years, in particular in logic. The ideals of these notational
schemes came to encroach on natural language with the rise of the international lan-
guage movement, a vibrant stream of activity from the 1880s until the end of the Sec-
ond World War which sought to institute a single language for international commu-
nication. From the beginning, the preferred solution was to engineer a new artiﬁcial
language for this purpose. Although there were innumerable competing plans and proj-
ects, the ﬁrst candidate to really capture the collective imagination was Volapük, which
soon gave way in the late 1880s to the incomparably more successful Esperanto, a lan-
guage that remains synonymous with these efforts to this day.38 Guiding the design of
all projects was the desire to create a language maximally “simple” and “logical.” These
concerns became evenmore marked with the ofﬁcial entrance of scholars into the move-
ment with the establishment of the Délégation pour l’adoption d’une langue auxiliaire
internationale at the Exposition Internationale of 1900 in Paris.
The Délégation was called into being by the mathematicians and philosophers Lé-
opold Leau (1868–1943) and Louis Couturat (1868–1914). It was to be a committee
that would examine the international language problem and recommend a solution
to the International Association of the Academies, the worldwide union of national
learned societies, which would deﬁnitively decide on the issue. The committee’s ﬁnal
37. See James McElvenny, “Grammar, Typology and the Humboldtian Tradition in the Work of
Georg von der Gabelentz,” Language and History, 60, no. 1 (2017): 1–20.
38. For scholarly accounts of the history of the international language movement in this period, see
Detlev Blanke, Internationale Plansprachen: Eine Einführung (Berlin: Akademie, 1985); and Peter G.
Forster, The Esperanto Movement (The Hague: Mouton, 1982).
på krigsstien (Copenhagen: Gad, 1893). Jespersen mentions them in his autobiography: Otto Jespersen,
A Linguist’s Life: An English Translation of Otto Jespersen’s Autobiography with Notes, Photos and a
Bibliography, ed. Arne Juul, Hans F. Nielsen, and Jørgen Erik Nielsen (Odense: Odense University
Press, 1995), 86–87. See also Hans Frede Nielsen, “Otto Jespersen’s Progress in Language Theory
and Georg von der Gabelentz,” in Beiträge zur Gabelentz-Forschung, ed. Kennosuke Ezawa, Franz
Hundsnurscher, and Annemete von Vogel (Tübingen: Narr, 2014), 199–212.
L I NGU I S T I C A E S TH E T I C S F ROM THE 1 9 T H TO TH E 2 0 TH C EN TURY | 425
report, delivered in 1908, recommended a reformed Esperanto, a proposal rejected by
the Esperanto movement; this reform project ultimately became the independent lan-
guage Ido (meaning “offspring”).39 Jespersen was a member of the committee, along with
the linguists Jan Baudouin de Courtenay (1845–1929) and Hugo Schuchardt (1842–
1927); all three were already known as defenders of constructed languages within lin-
guistics.40 It was, however, from the nonlinguists on the committee that Jespersen found
the greatest support for his conception of language. Most signiﬁcant here are Couturat
himself, the mathematician Giuseppe Peano (1858–1932), and the chemist WilhelmOst-
wald (1853–1932).
Couturat and Peano were both leading ﬁgures of the “logicist” camp in the philos-
ophy of mathematics, which sought to secure the conceptual foundations of mathe-
matics in logic. In their view, all mathematics could be reduced to arithmetic, and this
in turn to logic.41 This movement went hand in hand with the elaboration of new log-
ical formalisms; for both Couturat and Peano the constructed international language
would accord with the same principles. In this endeavor, both looked to the early En-
lightenment ﬁgure Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716),42 who in his contributions
to efforts in his day to construct “philosophical languages” eschewed the preconceived
classiﬁcatory schemes preferred by his contemporaries and instead aimed to elucidate
the composition of thoughts expressed in language, right down to the constitutive
primitive concepts. This would, he argued, not only offer a universal language, which,
because of the shared basis of rationality, would be understandable to all people, but
would also provide a calculus of thought that could automatically deliver proofs and
expose fallacies.43
The theorizing behind the new logical notations of the turn of the nineteenth to the
twentieth century—endorsed by Couturat, Peano, and many of their colleagues—en-
gages, as Humboldt had done in his earlier philosophical justiﬁcation for his views
on language typology, with analysis and synthesis in a Kantian sense. Gottlob Frege
39. Jespersen provided his own account of the Ido committee in Otto Jespersen, “History of Our
Language,” in Selected Writings of Otto Jespersen (1921; London: Allen & Unwin, 1960), 743–53.
40. The papers collected in Reinhard Haupenthal, ed., Plansprachen (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1976), provide a succinct overview of several prominent linguists’ positions on con-
structed international languages in this period.
41. See Ivor Grattan-Guiness, The Search for Mathematical Roots, 1870–1940 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2000).
42. See Louis Couturat, La logique de Leibniz (Paris: Germer, Baillière et Cie, 1901), 55–56; Hubert C.
Kennedy, Peano: Life and Works of Giuseppe Peano (Concord, CA: Peremptory Publications, 2006).
43. See chap. 5 of Jaap Maat, Philosophical Languages in the Seventeenth Century: Dalgarno, Wil-
kins, Leibniz (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004).
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(1848–1925)—another pioneer of logicism, acknowledged as an inspiration by Ber-
trand Russell (1872–1970) and involved in priority disputes with Peano—was driven
to invent his logical notation, the Begriffsschrift, by the conviction that mathematical
truths are in essence analytic judgements, and not synthetic, as Kant had claimed.
Kantian analytic judgments are essentially the sum of their parts, while synthetic judg-
ments come about through the irreducible contribution of human intuition. Against
Kant’s claim, Frege argued that mathematical truths are in fact analytic; all that is re-
quired is a suitable decomposition.44 The aim of the Begriffsschrift was to reveal this
analytic character and set it out in visible form.45 Peano did not address Kant directly
in his own theoretical work, but Russell drew the link: “The Kantian view . . . asserted
that mathematical reasoning is not strictly formal [i.e., analytic], but always uses intu-
itions [i.e., synthetic]. Thanks to the progress of Symbolic Logic, especially as treated
by Professor Peano, this part of the Kantian philosophy is now capable of a ﬁnal and
irrevocable refutation.”46 The linguistic and logical senses of “analytic”—both embed-
ded in Kantian philosophy—converged as a common desideratum in the language en-
gineering of the Délégation.
The rhetoric of efﬁciency espoused by Jespersen received its greatest reinforcement
within the Délégation from Wilhelm Ostwald who, through his theory of “energetics”
(Energetik), had a successful parallel career as a popular philosopher. Drawing above
all on contemporary advances in physics and chemistry, energetics was a monistic the-
ory of metaphysics that posited “energy” and its conversion from one form to another
as the fundamental principle of existence, in terms of which all else, including such
traditional metaphysical incommensurables as matter and consciousness, should be
understood.47 In Comtean fashion, this metaphysics extended into the human world,
into sociology—or the Kulturwissenschaft, as Ostwald preferred to call it—where the
development of all culture and society is conceived of as nothing more than a means of
making ever more efﬁcient use of available energy.48 Language was for Ostwald a do-
main of culture calling out to be optimized through deliberate intervention. His vision
44. Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (Oxford: Blackwell, 1959), 101.
Originally published as Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Breslau: Wilhelm Koebner, 1884).
45. Ibid., sec. 91. See also chaps. 3 and 4 of Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
46. Bertrand Russell, Principles of Mathematics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), 4.
47. See Volker Mueller, “Freigeistige Weltanschauung und naturwissenschaftlich begründeter
Monismus bei Wilhelm Ostwald,” in Wilhelm Ostwald: Monismus und Energie, ed. Arnher E. Lenz
(Neu-Isenburg: Lenz, 2012), 5–18.
48. Wilhelm Ostwald, Die energetischen Grundlagen der Kulturwissenschaft (Leipzig: Klinkhart,
1909), 37–39.
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of the optimal language accorded well with the pragmatic view to which Jespersen sub-
scribed. Language is a means of communicating concepts, and in the ideal language
each sign in the system would be associated uniquely with a single concept. The signs
themselves, whether in spoken or written form, would be as easy to produce and to
recognize as possible.49 This position became the ofﬁcial line of the Délégation, being
repeated by Couturat with attribution to Ostwald.50 Apart from their inherent design
inefﬁciencies, the multitude of existing languages, according to Ostwald, in itself rep-
resents a waste of energy, since we are obliged to learn more than one language or to
convert messages from one system to another. A single constructed international lan-
guage, with optimal design speciﬁcations, is the solution to this problem.51
Jespersen saw in Ostwald’s energetics a broad-ranging theory compatible with his
own views.52 Invoking somewhat off-handedly Humboldt’s notion of language as
Energeia, Jespersen insisted that Humboldt had not been nearly consequential enough
in his conception. Language, Jespersen argues, is indeed “energy,” which he under-
stands in his own terms as human effort directed to the end of communication, and
linguistic progress will inevitably occur as speakers make increasingly efﬁcient use
of this energy.53 Progress can, however, receive a helping hand from deliberate inter-
vention in language; this was Jespersen’s motivation for participating in the interna-
tional language movement.
A constant companion to linguistics and the humanities more generally through-
out the nineteenth century, showing many points of mutual inﬂuence, is evolutionary
theory in biology in its various forms. The most explicit and extreme attempt to align
language study with evolutionary theory was Schleicher’s biologism, mentioned above,
but evolutionary principles and rhetoric permeated the ﬁeld, even among Schleicher’s
opponents.54 Jespersen was well versed in contemporary discussions on biological evo-
lution and directly cited both Charles Darwin (1809–82) and Herbert Spencer (1820–
1903) in various works. He also made active use of Darwinian notions of selection
49. Ibid., 126–27.
50. Louis Couturat, “On the Application of Logic to the Problem of an International Language,” in
International Language and Science, ed. Louis Couturat, Otto Jespersen, Richard Lorzen, Wilhelm Ost-
wald, and Leopold Pfaundler (London: Constable & Company, 1910), 43–44.
51. Ibid., 131.
52. Jespersen, Efﬁciency, 382.
53. Jespersen, “Energetik der Sprache.”
54. For background on the interaction of linguistics and biological evolution in this period, see Ste-
phen G. Alter, Darwinism and the Linguistic Image: Language, Race and Natural Theology in the Nine-
teenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
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from among variants and the causes of speciation in his accounts of language change
as well as engaging with Darwin and Spencer’s writings on the origins of human lan-
guage.55 By his own account, however, Jespersen’s conception of “progress” differed
from that propagated in biology. Jespersen admits to being from his student days “un-
der the spell” of the “evolutionary prejudice,” a description he attributes to Edward
Sapir (1884–1939).56 But he soon found accounts of progress current in evolutionary
theory, such as Spencer’s view that progress consists in increasing heterogeneity, to be
incompatible with his own pragmatic approach, which emphasized simplicity and uni-
formity. “I took ‘Progress in Language’ to mean something totally different from what
Spencer spoke of in the linguistic paragraphs of his essay ‘Progress, its Law and Cause,’”
writes Jespersen.57 “He there speaks exclusively of greater and greater heterogeneity—
an increasing number of parts of speech, of words to express the most varied ideas,
of languages and dialects produced by the splitting up of one uniform language. I took
progress in the more popular sense of advance in usefulness, which Spencer here to-
tally neglects.”58 Jespersen goes on to comment, however, that he was impressed by Spen-
cer’s stylistic advice, which advocates expressions that minimize the effort required on
the part of the hearer, although Jespersen felt that he should have also considered the
needs of the speaker.59
The nineteenth century opened with a conception of linguistic aesthetics that praised
the “organic” qualities of Indo-European inﬂection and deprecated the “mechanical”
procedure of other morphological types. By the end of the century, Jespersen had in-
verted these judgments and held up the “simplest mechanism,” the most efﬁcient ma-
chine for transmitting concepts, as the linguistic ideal, an ideal that could be approached
by deliberate linguistic engineering. Elsewhere Jespersen praised the “ ‘noiseless’ ma-
chinery” of English,60 the modern European language furthest down the analytic path,
and the language most despised by Schleicher for precisely this analytic degeneracy.
55. See James D. McCawley, “The Biological Side of Otto Jespersen’s Linguistic Thought,” His-
toriographia Linguistica 19, no. 1 (1992): 97–110.
56. Jespersen, Efﬁciency, 381.
57. Herbert Spencer, “Progress: Its Law and Cause,” in Essays: Scientiﬁc, Political and Speculative,
vol. 1, ed. Herbert Spencer (1857; London: Williams & Norgate, 1891), 8–62. On 23–26, Spencer com-
ments speciﬁcally on alleged growing heterogeneity in language evolution.
58. Jespersen, Efﬁciency, 381–82.
59. Ibid. Jespersen refers here to Herbert Spencer, “The Philosophy of Style,” in Essays: Scientiﬁc,
Political and Speculative, vol. 2, ed. Herbert Spencer (1852; London: Williams & Norgate, 1891), 333–
69.
60. Otto Jespersen, AModern English Grammar on Historical Principles, Part VI: Morphology (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1954), 85.
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I I . REACT IONS
In contemporary reactions to Jespersen’s theory of progress in language, the retreat
into cold formalism and accompanying dismissal of any kind of evaluation that is fa-
miliar today was already present. But this opinion does not exhaust the range of reac-
tions: also present were more nuanced views, the most interesting of which is perhaps
that of Charles Bally. Although he still rejected Jespersen’s judgmental notion of prog-
ress, Bally imposed no blanket taboo on assessing the properties of languages. For
him, however, the question revolves not around the structure and composition of lan-
guage systems but the use to which their speakers put them.
The formalist rejection of language evaluation is clearly expressed by Bernard Bloch
(1907–1965) in his review of Jespersen’s Efﬁciency in Linguistic Change.61 “Is it part of
a linguist’s business to rate languages or linguistic features on a scale of practical values?”
asks Bloch, and then concludes: “We can describe and codify the facts of language, and
we can explain them, within the framework of our science, by historical statements; to
judge their usefulness or their beauty is to go outside that framework. . . . This does not
mean, of course, that a linguist is debarred by his profession from having opinions or
tastes. In his unofﬁcial capacity as a human being and a user of language, he can no
more help making judgments than anyone else.”62 Jespersen’s folly, and that of the old
evaluative language classiﬁcation, was to permit human fancies to encroach on the dis-
passionate scientiﬁc enterprise.
Bloch was an adherent of the school of American Structuralism that grew up
around Leonard Bloomﬁeld (1887–1949), and his unwavering commitment to formal-
ism essentially represents a radicalization of the doctrines of that school. Bloomﬁeld
himself stated that languages have a diachronic tendency toward “simpliﬁcation,” with
“shorter and more regularly constructed words”63 and cited Jespersen’s Progress in
Language in support of this claim.64 He even incorporated Jespersen’s hypothesis into
the formal framework of his theory, including the historical movement to shorter and
more regular forms as underlying “assumptions” in his “postulates for a science of lan-
guage.”65 A prime feature of Jespersen’s Progress, in Bloomﬁeld’s opinion, was that it
61. Bernard Bloch, review of Efﬁciency in Linguistic Change, by Otto Jespersen, Language 17, no. 4
(1941): 350–53.
62. Ibid., 352–53.
63. Leonard Bloomﬁeld, Language (New York: Holt & Co., 1933), 509. Compare Joseph and
Newmeyer, “All Languages Are Equally Complex,” 347.
64. Bloomﬁeld, Language, 524.
65. Leonard Bloomﬁeld, “A Set of Postulates for the Science of Language,” Language 2, no. 3 (1926):
163–64.
430 | H ISTORY OF HUMANIT IES FA L L 2 0 1 7
more or less presented this tendency as a simple observed fact. But Jespersen’s later
writings, so felt Bloomﬁeld, took the unfortunate turn of trying to account for language
change by making ever greater appeals to language users’ “desires or needs.”66
However, unlike Bloch, Bloomﬁeld never forbade questions about the potential ex-
tralinguistic causes and implications of the apparent tendency to simpliﬁcation—and
about language change more generally—but rather postponed them to a time when
the sciences had advanced to a point where such questions could be proﬁtably posed
and answered: “It is apparent even now that we can see historical change in human
affairs most intimately in the change of language, but it is evident also, that we shall
have to know far more both of practical (that is, extra-linguistic) events and of linguis-
tic changes that have actually occurred, before we can reach the level of scientiﬁc clas-
siﬁcation and prediction.”67 Bloomﬁeld’s restriction of the tasks of linguistics was no
doubt encouraged by his adherence to the doctrine of “uniﬁed science” propagated
by his logical positivist colleagues, with whom he came into increasingly intensive con-
tact and collaboration in these years.68 A compartmentalized linguistics could concen-
trate on describing the formal apparatus of languages, conﬁdent that neighboring sci-
ences would in due course help to complete the picture.69
Among Bloomﬁeld’s contemporary intellectual allies—as opposed to his doctrinaire
disciplines—language evaluation and engineering continued to be considered legiti-
mate tasks of linguistics. The psychologist Albert Paul Weiss (1879–1931)—generally
credited with converting Bloomﬁeld to the psychological school of behaviorism70—in-
cluded such tasks in his programmatic list of “language problems common to both lin-
guistics and psychology which need more intensive investigation.”71 Weiss—and fol-
lowing him, Bloomﬁeld—conceived of language as nothing more than a very complex
system of signaling between humans that allows them to extend their chain of stimuli
66. Leonard Bloomﬁeld, review of Language, Its Nature, Development and Origin, by Otto Jespersen,
American Journal of Philology 43, no. 4 (1922): 371. For a detailed examination of Bloomﬁeld’s reception
of Jespersen, including his theory of progress in language, see Julia S. Falk, “Otto Jespersen, Leonard
Bloomﬁeld and American Structural Linguistics,” Language 68, no. 3 (1992): 465–91.
67. Bloomﬁeld, Language, 509.
68. See Henry Hiz and Pierre Swiggers, “Bloomﬁeld the Logical Positivist,” Semiotica 79 (1990):
257–70.
69. Compare Leonard Bloomﬁeld, Linguistic Aspects of Science, International Encyclopedia of Uni-
ﬁed Science, vol. 1, no. 4 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).
70. See, e.g., Peter Hugoe Matthews, A Short History of Structural Linguistics (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2001), 21–22. As is often observed, Bloomﬁeld’s 1926 “set of postulates for
the science of language” was modeled on Albert Paul Weiss, “One Set of Postulates for a Behavioristic
Psychology,” Psychological Review 32, no. 1 (1925): 83–87.
71. Albert Paul Weiss, “Linguistics and Psychology,” Language 1, no. 2 (1925): 54–55.
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and responses beyond the individual and displace it across space and time.72 This view
of language is essentially Jespersen’s communicative conception in behaviorist guise. A
united scientiﬁc linguistics and behaviorist psychology, argued Weiss,73 could contrib-
ute to such ends as making English more accurate and easier to learn, fashioning a uni-
versal language, and comparing and improving the structural forms as well as the pho-
netic and written substance of other existing languages.
But the radicalization of the next generation turned Bloomﬁeld’s postponement
into banishment. In Bloch’s estimation, the spirit evinced by Jespersen puts him in the
company of heretics that transgress the formalist faith by countenancing questions of
the external entanglements of linguistic form.74 Not distinguishing degrees of heresy,
Bloch includes Charles Bally in this group. Bally was, however, also an opponent of
Jespersen’s theory, albeit for very different reasons. Departing from an enduring ten-
dency of linguistics to seek the abstract systems behind languages—famously codiﬁed
at this time by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) in his notion of langue75—Bally
sought to elaborate, in his signature theory of “stylistics” (stylistique), an approach that
studies languages as means employed by speakers in order to express themselves in
life.76 Bally goes to some length to deﬁne “stylistics” as a precisely delimited technical
term: it is to be distinguished from traditional literary stylistics, which treats the style
of a particular author, as well as from a study of general principles of expression in hu-
man languages.77
Addressing such issues as language use and expression would be enough on its own
to run afoul of a conﬁrmed Bloomﬁeldian, but Bally also engaged in the kind of spec-
72. Ibid., 52–53. Compare Bloomﬁeld, Language, 22–29. It is worth noting that Weiss’s article, a
thoroughly programmatic paper, appeared in the second issue of the journal Language, which was
in fact the ﬁrst issue to contain substantive contributions; the contents of the inaugural issue did
not extend beyond fanfare and formalities. Language is the ofﬁcial journal of the Linguistic Society
of America, the chief professional society for linguistics in North America, among whose founders
was Bloomﬁeld.
73. Weiss, “Linguistics and Psychology,” 54–55.
74. Bloch, review of Efﬁciency in Linguistic Change, 351.
75. As coeditor, with Albert Sechehaye (1870–1946), of Ferdinand de Saussure’s Cours de lin-
guistique générale (Paris: Payot, 1916), Charles Bally was of course instrumental in bringing into the
world the foundational Saussurean scripture. Bally himself cannot, however, really be described as a
Saussurean: he was never Saussure’s student, and in fact had arrived at many of his own theoretical
positions before he even encountered Saussure. See Sylvie Durrer, Introduction à la linguistique de
Charles Bally (Lausanne: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1998).
76. Charles Bally, Traité de stylistique française, 2nd ed. (1909; Paris: Klincksieck, 1921).
77. Ibid., 17–20. The potential ambiguity that arises from the different senses of “style” is most
probably what led Bally to eventually abandon the term stylistique in favor of énonciation, a designa-
tion that persisted throughout the century in francophone linguistics.
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ulation about links between language and mind that is anathema to the strict formal-
ist. How a language is used, argued Bally, reﬂects the mentality of its speakers. For ex-
ample, in the European languages—even those with different genetic origins, such as
Hungarian and Finnish—we can identify a shared “European stylistics” (stylistique euro-
péenne) that rests on a common “European mentality” (mentalité européenne).78 Seem-
ingly unknown to Bloch—or at least unacknowledged by him—Bally’s position here in
fact represents a ﬁssure between him and Jespersen. Jespersen was interested in the pres-
sures shaping abstract linguistic systems, whereas Bally looked for the inﬂuences on the
way in which linguistic systems are used to produce speech. The ﬁssure widens when
we consider the nature of the factors respectively considered by Jespersen and Bally.
The transferring of propositional content that lies at the basis of Jespersen’s commu-
nicative conception of language is reduced to just one, subordinate aspect of language
in Bally’s account, the “intellectual” side of language. More important for Bally is the
“affective” side: how speakers represent themselves, their subjective feelings, and their
place among other speakers.79 The concrete goal of his stylistics was to examine and rep-
resent the affective variants offered within each language system: stylistics “studies the
affective value of the facts of organized language, and the reciprocal action of expressive
facts that compete to form the system of means of expression of a language.”80
A consequence of Bally’s emphasis on the affective dimension of language is his ab-
negation of the Enlightenment ideal of language as a logical, unambiguous sign system.
This ideal is, according to Bally, in fact antithetical to real human language, since it priv-
ileges its intellectual side to the absolute detriment of its affective dimension. The am-
biguity in language that the logicians seek to abolish is in fact a necessary product of the
extension of word meanings and grammatical functions that comes about because of
“expressivity” (expressivité ), the craving of speakers to express themselves in fresh and
vivid ways, a notion reminiscent of Gabelentz’s drive to distinctness in its aesthetic as-
pect. Existing expressions, through repeated use, inevitably become stale and dull, and
for this reason there is an imperative to constantly innovate. Among the examples cited
by Bally is the adoption of tête—etymologically testa ‘pot’—as the usual word for “head”
in French, replacing the descendants of the Latin etymon caput ‘head’. Now the ordi-
nary word for “head” and therefore expressively weak, tête is in turn being edged out
in present-day colloquial French by newer alternatives, such as bille, caboche, citrone,
78. Ibid., 23–24.
79. Durrer, Introduction, 113–20; Bally, Traité, 12.
80. “[La stylistique] . . . étudie la valeur affective des faits du langage organisé, et l’action réciproque
des faits expressifs qui concourent à former le système des moyens d’expression d’une langue” (Bally,
Traité, 1).
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and so forth. In terms comparable to Whitney’s remarks on the tendency to economy,
Bally observes that this process of normalization and blunting of senses is frequently
accompanied by an abbreviation of form. In this way, automobile, vélocipède, and che-
min de fer métropolitain become auto, vélo, métro, collapsing the compositionality of
these forms. What were once compounds slavishly spelling out their senses are now
inscrutable snippets used to evoke complex but mundane concepts.81 In these exam-
ples and others we see the primacy of the affective over the intellectual in human lan-
guage: “The history of a few facts demonstrates to us that the requirements of expres-
sion—that is, of life—are more pressing than those of logic; expressivity avoids exact
notation of facts and pushes for incessant innovations; in effect, nothing wears out more
than that which is expressive, and from there comes the obligation to constantly in-
novate.”82
Bally’s abandonment of Enlightenment linguistic ideals and embracing of the deno-
tative chaos engendered by expressivity entails a relativism akin to that manifested by
Gabelentz. For Bally, as for Gabelentz, there is no single measure or ideal. Bally was not
alone among his contemporaries in endorsing such linguistic relativism, even though it
was being increasingly overwhelmed by formalism in the mainstream. One of the best
illustrations of these alternative relativistic conceptions comes from the second round
of academic involvement in the international language movement.83 As was perhaps fore-
seeable, the Délégation pour l’adoption d’une langue auxiliaire internationale did not
deﬁnitively resolve the international language question. In 1924, a little more than de-
cade after the Délégation ofﬁcially concluded its efforts, the New York philanthropist
Alice Vanderbilt Morris (1874–1950) called the International Auxiliary Language As-
sociation (IALA) into being, to once again seek a scientiﬁc solution to the problem of
international communication.84 Like the Délégation before it, IALA organized meetings
81. Charles Bally, Le langage et la vie, 3rd ed. (1913; Geneva: Droz, 1965), 39.
82. “L’histoire de quelques faits nous apprendra que les nécessités de l’expression, c’est-à-dire de la
vie, sont plus impérieuses que celles de la logique; l’expressivité évite la notation exacte des faits et
pousse à des créations incessantes; en effet, rien ne s’use autant que ce qui est expressif; de là
l’obligation de toujours innover” (ibid., 38).
83. The speciﬁc example of the international language movement is chosen here to illustrate debates
on linguistic aesthetics because of the common ground with Jespersen. This is not the only potential nar-
rative, however. Bally’s stylistics could also be discussed against the background of contemporary stylistic
and “idealist” approaches to linguistics, represented in more extreme—and often polemical—form by
such scholars as Karl Vossler (1872–1949) and Leo Spitzer (1887–1960). For Bally’s stylistique in this con-
text, see Étienne Karabétian, Histoire des stylistiques (Paris: Armand Colin, 2000).
84. See pt. 2 of Julia S. Falk, Women, Language and Linguistics: Three American Stories from the
First Half of the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1999); Frank J. Esterhill, Interlingua Institute:
A History (New York: Interlingua Institute, 2000).
434 | H ISTORY OF HUMANIT IES FAL L 2 0 1 7
of experts to examine the international language problem. Jespersen, unsurprisingly,
was among the most active contributors to IALA’s efforts. More surprisingly, given
his theoretical views, Bally was also involved. The multitude and diversity of languages,
according to Bally, is another natural consequence of expressivity. Even as dominant di-
alects overwhelm their minority rivals, new islands of difference will appear as new ex-
pressive forms arise within speciﬁc occupational and recreational groups and other social
milieux.85 In opposition to Jespersen and his like-minded colleagues, Bally imagined and
embraced increasing heterogeneity in languages. Although he was clearly hostile to the
notion of an international language, his participation in IALA’s activities is perhaps some-
what more explicable in light of the commissions paid.
Both Bally and Jespersen were present at the 1930 international conference of the
IALA in Geneva. As recorded in the protocol of the meeting, Jespersen led most of the
discussions, while Bally had very little to say. Bally’s name appears only to record his
acknowledgment of the submission of various motions.86 But Bally had already aired
his views on how a constructed international language would operate, if it could be in-
stituted. The dream of an “improved” language was unrealistic; the international lan-
guage could be no more than a kind of amalgam of the common European style and
its associated mentality. To speakers of Chinese or African languages, it would be just
as foreign and present just as many hurdles as any existing European language.87
This relativistic position, which deﬂated the optimistic idealism of the earlier logi-
cians, in fact became the ofﬁcial position of IALA, courtesy of its head of linguistic re-
search in its early years, Edward Sapir. For Sapir, there was no absolute standard for
judging languages: “Language in its fundamental forms is the symbolic expression
of human intuitions. . . . If, therefore, we wish to understand language in its true in-
wardness we must disabuse our minds of preferred ‘values’ and accustom ourselves to
look upon English and Hottentot with the same cool, but interested, detachment.”88
Any postulation of a single direction of development in language would be a manifes-
tation of the nineteenth-century “evolutionary prejudice,” which, as noted above, Jes-
persen acknowledged as an inﬂuence on his early thought.89 Sapir’s relativism is clas-
sically identiﬁed with that of his teacher Franz Boas (1858–1942), who is taken to have
introduced the modern conception of the uniqueness and equality of all cultures into
85. Bally, Le langage et la vie, 46–50.
86. Reinhard Haupenthal, ed., Protokolle der Konferenz der International Language Association
(IALA) in Genf 20. März bis 2. April 1930 (Bad Bellingen: Edition Iltis, 2012).
87. Bally, Traité, 24.
88. Edward Sapir, Language (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1921), 124.
89. Ibid. See Sec. I of this article for Jespersen’s account of the role of evolutionary theory in his
thinking.
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anthropology and related ﬁelds.90 But Boas’s ideas did not appear out of a vacuum:
there is a case to be made that Boas had important predecessors connected to the
Humboldtian tradition, in particular in the Völkerpsychologie of Moritz Lazarus and
H. Steinthal, which also served Gabelentz as a key point of reference in elaborating his
own related ideas.91 There is therefore already an established and varied relativistic tra-
dition in linguistics at this time, which refused a single standard against which lan-
guages can be measured, among whose representatives Sapir and Gabelentz may be
counted.92 Bally’s position differs from these others, however, in that he looks to style
in language use rather than properties of language systems themselves.
At a following meeting of IALA in New York, Sapir drew the consequences of his
position: “So far as the logical structure of a language is concerned, we are perhaps not
at the end of our researches. . . . [W]e, who are fashioning Occidental culture[,] have
been using certain useful linguistic tools. These tools vary from place to place, but by
and large are remarkably similar. . . . [W]hy not use the common bond of experience
which is implicit in the use of all these tools in a simpliﬁed and regularized form?”93
While “simpliﬁed” and “regularized” were still desiderata, the univocal ediﬁce of pure
logic was abandoned in favor of more homely expression.94 Even after the departure of
Sapir from IALA, his relativism remained. The ﬁnal grammatical goal of IALA was to
construct a language on the pattern of “Standard Average European,” a term coined by
Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897–1941), a student of Sapir’s, to designate precisely the kind
of commonality between the European languages that such scholars as Sapir and Bally
had identiﬁed.95 In the present-day linguistic consciousness Sapir and Whorf are syn-
90. For a detailed account, see Regna Darnell, And Along Came Boas: Continuity and Revolution in
Americanist Anthropology (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1998).
91. See Ivan Kalmar, “The Völkerpsychologie of Lazarus and Steinthal and the Modern Concept of
Culture,” Journal of the History of Ideas 48, no. 4 (1987): 671–90; McElvenny, “Grammar, Typology
and the Humboldtian Tradition.”
92. Compare Els Elffers, “The History of Thought about Language and Thought,” in Linguistics in
the Netherlands 1996, ed. Crit Cremers and Marcel den Dikken (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1996), 73–84.
93. Edward Sapir, “Foundations of Language,” in International Auxiliary Language Association in
the United States, Inc.: Annual Meeting, May 19, 1930 (New York: IALA, 1930), 17–18.
94. Jespersen did not entirely deny the desirability of adapting the international language to forms
in existing languages, but his suggestions in this direction amounted to no more than selecting lexical
roots that were already found in numerous European languages and so would be familiar to most
learners. These efforts did not therefore challenge his a priori theorizing about optimal linguistic form.
See, e.g., Otto Jespersen, “The Linguistic Principles Necessary for the Construction of an International
Language,” in Couturat et al., International Language and Science, 27–41.
95. See Esterhill, Interlingua Institute, 23; Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality:
Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1956).
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onymous with linguistic relativism, as lexicalized in the common binominal designa-
tion “Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis.”
Beyond his fundamental disagreement with the Enlightenment ideal of language
advocated by Jespersen, Bally contends that any notion of “progress,” in the sense of
teleological development, is incoherent. Here in accord with Saussurean orthodoxy,
Bally insists on the unrelenting synchronic nature of language. Speakers live in the pres-
ent: they can do no more than try to express themselves with the means their language
offers at a single point in time. There is no more distant goal toward which they strive
and toward which they can direct the development of their language. Of course, admits
Bally, there is a very superﬁcial sense in which progress is observable in language, in
that new words are coined or borrowed to name technical and intellectual advances
in civilization, but these changes, he argues, do not touch the internal structure of the lin-
guistic system. The elaboration of exemplary literary style on the part of some authors—
such as reﬁned expository prose—also has no bearing on the structure of a language itself
and its diachronic changes.96
Progress in language is an illusion caused by singling out speciﬁc features in a lan-
guage and using them to conﬁrm preconceived value judgments, generally without re-
gard for the actual historical processes that led to their development.97 The emergence
of the deﬁnite and indeﬁnite articles in French, observes Bally, is often treated as a sign
of the language’s logical superiority. It is true that the articles mark distinctions that
were expressed less overtly and less consistently in proto-Indo-European and the im-
mediate ancestor of French, Latin. However, the American language Dakota similarly
possesses deﬁnite and indeﬁnite articles and yet is not held up as a paradigm of logical
language. In terms of their actual historical development, the French articles came into
being in a “period of semi-barbarity” (époque de demi-barbarie) and so could not in
any case be treated as a sign of the superior mental development of French speakers
at the time. Even in the modern language, the French articles do not exclusively serve
the purpose of indicating deﬁniteness. They are among the last remnants of the ances-
tral gender system, a feature generally considered to be a decorative luxury, far from
the concerns of logic. With increasing phonetic attrition in the present-day language,
they are also necessary for indicating number distinctions on nouns.98 In the vicissi-
tudes of language history functions are loaded on and lost to forms without any over-
arching plan.
96. Bally, Le langage et la vie, 36. Bally’s distinction between different senses of “style” and
stylistique, mentioned above, is of course relevant here.
97. Ibid., 34.
98. Ibid., 44–45.
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The same principles, argues Bally, apply to Jespersen’s standard-bearer of linguistic
progress, the apparent move toward analyticity in grammar, which he also believes is
an illusion. All language systems proceed through an eternal cycle that oscillates be-
tween the extremes of synthesis and analysis: “A linguistic form evolving through time
can be compared to an accordion that extends and contracts.”99 Bally attributes this
cycle to the driving force of expressivity. Striving for more emphatic expression, speak-
ers of vulgar Latin elaborated the analytic form intrare habeo, “I will go in,” to replace
the worn-out synthetic form intrabo. But through repeated use the new form in turn
became usual and ﬂat, and in French collapsed into the abbreviated synthetic form
j’entrerai. Speakers of present-day French have now developed a number of new an-
alytic future forms to once again expand the expressive possibilities: je vais entrer, je
veux entrer.100 The cyclical view of grammatical evolution was not new with Bally.101
In fact, from the beginning Jespersen had defended his theory against the idea, arguing
that, even if isolated synthetic forms or irregularities in a language can spring up, the
overall tendency in all linguistic systems when viewed as wholes is toward greater an-
alyticity.102 One curious aspect of the contrary arguments of Jespersen and Bally is that
each accuses the other of looking at language atomistically. Bally insists that Jespersen
can only imagine progress in language because he focuses on isolated features, while
Jespersen contends that Bally is blind to progress because he fails to see the whole lan-
guage system.103
I I I . CONCLUSION
The abstention from value judgments about languages current among mainstream lin-
guists today is of relatively recent vintage. Leading linguists of the nineteenth century
were not afraid to make their feelings known. They found in their chief object of study,
the classical Indo-European languages, characterized by their “synthetic” morpholog-
99. “Une forme linguistique évoluant à travers le temps peut être comparée à un accordéon qui
tantôt se distend et tantôt se replie” (ibid., 43).
100. Ibid., 42.
101. The cyclical nature of grammatical evolution—and indeed the examples Bally uses to illustrate
it—is a key assumption of the modern ﬁeld of “grammaticalization,” which traces its heritage in part
back to Bally’s colleague Antoine Meillet (1886–1936). For an introduction to the ﬁeld, with brief his-
torical background, see Elizabeth Traugott and Paul Hopper, Grammaticalization, 2nd ed. (1993; Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For a recent discussion of the standard historical narrative
of the ﬁeld, see James McElvenny, “The Secret History of Grammaticalization,” History and Philoso-
phy of the Language Sciences, October 17, 2016, https://hiphilangsci.net/2016/04/28/the-secret-history
-of-grammaticalization/
102. For example, Jespersen, Language, 424–25.
103. Jespersen, Efﬁciency, 385–86; Bally, Le langage et la vie, 34.
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ical structures, the ideal medium for human thought and constructed elaborate theo-
retical schemes to justify their judgments. The modern European languages, in losing
the characteristic morphological intricacies and thereby becoming ever more “analytic,”
represented for these scholars degeneracy and decline. This is the attitude of a discipline
emerging from philology, seeking to conﬁrm its prejudices through arguments that draw
on the prestige of Kantian idealism.
Jespersen’s theory of progress in language amounted to no more than an inversion
of the traditional value judgments. Inspired by a new emphasis from the middle of the
nineteenth century on language as a vehicle of communication, Jespersen saw in the an-
alytic forms of modern languages a more efﬁcient means of achieving this end. The fussy
synthetic forms of the older languages represented for him an impediment to be over-
come rather than the height of linguistic evolution. His opinion was reinforced by de-
velopments at the time in neighboring sciences—above all logic and mathematics—with
which Jespersen came into contact through the linguistic engineering efforts of the in-
ternational language movement. The goal aspired to in these circles was a revival of the
Enlightenment ideal of language as an unambiguous, universal sign system. Here mod-
ernist optimism and pragmatism superseded the old idealism.
Inchoate versions of the present-day position, in which all language evaluation is
taboo, are visible in contemporary reactions to Jespersen’s theory. From the Bloom-
ﬁeldian school, in particular, emerged an increasingly uncompromising formalism that
objected to any attempt to assess linguistic forms in terms of the functions they might
fulﬁll. This formalism, however, represents a radicalization of a more tolerant restric-
tion and compartmentalization of the tasks of linguistics, which still respected the pros-
pect of links between language, the mind and the world as questions to be addressed by
the more advanced sciences of the future.
Other scholars continued to entertain such questions while rejecting the speciﬁc pa-
rameters of Jespersen’s thesis. Charles Bally was committed to a synchronic conception
of language on the Saussurean model and could see no way in which a coherent notion
of diachronic progress could be articulated. What most distinguishes Bally from Jes-
persen, his nineteenth-century forebears and even the proto-formalists, however, was
his shift of focus from the language system itself to the use that speakers make of it
in expressing themselves. It is the needs of expression, according to Bally, that drive
the messy polysemy and subtle variety of language so lamented by the logicians. The
Enlightenment ideal is in fact incompatible with real language. The inherent relativism
of his position puts him in the company of such ﬁgures as Gabelentz and Sapir, who
similarly refused a single ranking of languages but continued to consider the ways in
which languages reﬂect the mentalities of their speakers. All alternative conceptions
were, however, ultimately submerged by the rising formalist tide in the mainstream.
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